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Abstract: 
This chapter explores the motivations for joining violent groups across a range of circumstances.  In 
particular the chapter will explore the similarities in both entry and exit among groups as diverse as 
street gangs and terrorist organisations.  Frequently membership in violent groups is explained in 
terms of individual material gain or the attainment of individual fame. Indeed many of these studies 
treat joining these groups and the deployment of violent as being anti-social. However, much can be 
gained by seeing these groups in completely the opposite light: gangs, factions, militias, even terrorist 
organisations can be highly social environment, especially for those who feel that they have limited 
opportunities for social capital accumulation or mobility, or indeed have even been expelled from a 
social milieu for mobility altogether.  Within such social milieus violence is but one form of social 
action among a whole range social acts; or to put it more succinctly, in such circumstances violence 
itself is a social act.   For those who experience family instability, or otherwise experience low social 
status, joining a violent group might become one of the means of accumulating social capital, and 
experience upward social mobility. Violence itself may be the act that produces social capital, and at 
the same time reinforces group membership.  It does so in a number of ways.  Violent imaginaries 
join groups together. Demonstrations of this shared violent imaginary become the means of 
expressing group belonging.  Similarly violence becomes the means of communicating with group 
members, as the means of reinforcing collective solidarity, and demonstrating distance and distinction 
from other groups that become the targets of violence. Those who commit violence may not be 
making an individual decision to be “bad” or “evil”; they may be responding to social expectations 
and norms in a specific environment.  They may be performing their identity. 
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This chapter explores the motivations for joining violent groups across a range of 
circumstances.  In particular, the chapter will explore the similarities in the role of violence as 
a marker of identity within groups as diverse as street gangs and ethnic communities.  
Frequently, membership in violent groups is explained in terms of individual material gain or 
the attainment of individual fame, in very rationalist and individualistic terms.2 These violent 
encounters or employments of violence by young people are often defined as being 
interpersonal in nature; that is, the motivation to use or not use violence is held by a single 
individual, expressing individual agency in making a choice whether or not to deploy 
violence.3 This focus on individual choice and motivation has likewise been extended to 
studies of terrorism and rationalist interpretations for the motivation to participate in civil 
wars or other armed conflicts.4 Indeed, many of these studies treat joining these violent 
groups and the deployment of violent acts as being anti-social, as if the choice to engage in 
violence is one wholly against social norms or social values.5 However, much can be gained 
by seeing these groups in completely the opposite light: gangs, communal factions, militias, 
even terrorist organisations can be seen as highly social environments, especially for those 
who feel that they have limited opportunities for social capital accumulation or mobility 
within larger society, or indeed have even been expelled from a mainstream social mobility 
milieu altogether.   Within such social milieus violence is but one form of social action 
among a whole range social acts;6 or to put it more succinctly, in such circumstances violence 
itself is a social act.  This chapter will examine the performative qualities of violence and the 
role that violence plays in the experience of belonging in large groups and in collective 
identity formation.  
 
The first part of the chapter will explore the communicative aspect of violence and its role in 
the processes of collective identity formation.  The second section examines the relationships 
between the performances of collective identity and the accumulation of social capital. The 
third section explores these processes more deeply by analysing the importance of subject 
positions and the judgment or evaluation of identity performances through a new proposal of 
a violence triangle.  The fourth section explores how violence can be held as a group value 
and examines this proposition in light of some of the findings from the European Study of 
Youth Mobilisation (ESYM).7   The paper concludes by suggesting that if we understand the 
social meaning of violence in a given set of circumstances it may be possible to replace 
violence with a less harmful social practice. 
 
The Discourse of Violence: Symbolic Dimensions 
 
Violence is not senseless.  Rather violence is a set of actions, whether verbal or physical, 
personal or institutional, that is performed or imagined by social beings under specific 
historical conditions for concrete reasons. Collective narratives are constructed to explain and 
                                                
2 L Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy/Containing the Threat (Random House, 
2006). 
3 D Gottfredson and E Bauer, Interventions to Prevent Youth Violence in Handbook of Injury and Violence 
Prevention (World Health Organisation, 2006).   
4 See P Collier and A Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars (World Bank, 2000); J Horgan, The 
Psychology of Terrorism (Routledge, 2005). 
5 JH Hitchcock, Adolescent gang participation: Psychological perspectives (2001) 16 Journal of Police and 
Criminal Psychology 33-47. 
6 TK Beck, The Eye of the Beholder: Violence as a Social Process (2011) 5 International Journal of Conflict 
and Violence 346-7. 
7 British Council, Listening to Radicals: Attitudes and Motivations of Young People Engaged in Political and 
Social Movements Outside of the Mainstream in Central and Nordic Europe (British Council, 2011).  
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make sense of acts of violence made in a group’s name.  Such narratives carry these acts of 
violence into the collective imaginary, weaving them into the very identity fabric of the 
group.  Violence, therefore, is not devoid of meaning.  It also does not just happen; rather, it 
is done and is ‘not something that people do in general, but is always done to something or 
someone in particular’8 even if the target was not the one intended.  Moreover, violence 
comes in many forms, beginning with the physical and the interpersonal, but also ranging to 
the collective and communal, the structural and the symbolic. As such, violence is a realm of 
social interaction.  Further, it is legitimated; or to use David Riches’ definition of violence, it 
is an act of harm deemed legitimate by the perpetrator and some witnesses.9 More than that, 
Riches suggests that violence is a form communication that is accessible, easily perceived 
and easily understood.10 It is an act based in legitimacy by the perpetrator and some witnesses 
and will form the basis of making sense of the outcomes in a similar framework of 
legitimacy.  Teresa Koloma Beck points out that the anthropologically inspired Berlin school, 
led by Georg Elwert, began to investigate the interactions between violence and other social 
acts and the formation of larger social structures ‘at a time when dominant discourses 
emphasised the barbaric and irrational character of contemporary violence’.11 The social 
component was important for Elwert, for as Bettina Schmidt and Ingo Schröder write that 
while ‘violence without a witness will still leave people dead, it is socially meaningless’.12 
For the likes of Elwert, Schmidt and Schröder, dismissing violence as simply “bad” or worse 
something so repugnant as to not be studied, is to miss a whole realm of everyday sociability 
and interaction defining many communities. Georg Simmel engaged in a similar investigation 
nearly one hundred years before Elwert, as he was one of the first to look beyond violence as 
some ‘unregulated primordial aggressiveness in the depths of mankind’13 and to see it as a 
realm of interaction, set in a particular context, often to serve specific ends.  He argued in a 
piece from 1903 that enmities and conflict play multiple roles both within and across groups: 
‘enmities not merely prevent gradual disappearance of the boundaries within a society –and 
for this reason these enmities may be consciously promoted as [the] guarantee of the existing 
social constitution – but more than this the enmities are directly productive sociologically’.14 
In this Simmel saw violence as a synchronic event of social relations between individuals and 
a collective that served specific functions at both an inter-group and intra-group level.  The 
violence both shapes and is shaped by those inter and intra-group relationships.   
 
Although often difficult to see, conflict and its frequent partner violence, can serve many 
roles, some of which may be productive, perhaps even constructive.  One role that violence 
often does serve is to delimit the boundaries of large group identities.  Determining who is a 
target of violence and who is not; who is to be protected and who is to be made vulnerable; 
who is to be trusted and whom not are questions that inform the often split second decisions 
by which individuals determine who is within their own large group constellation, who is 
outside of it and therefore who is a threat.  To explore the role of violence within identity 
                                                
8 V Bufacchi, Violence and Social Justice (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007) 33. 
9 D Riches, The Phenomenon of Violence in D Riches (ed) The Anthropology of Violence (Basil-Blackwell, 
1986) 8. 
10 Ibid, 11. 
11 TK Beck, The Eye of the Beholder: Violence as a Social Process (2011) 5 International Journal of Conflict 
and Violence 346. 
12 B Schmidt and I Schröder, Introduction: Violent Imaginaries and Violent Practices in B Schmidt and I 
Schröder (eds) Anthropology of Violence and Conflict (Routledge, 2001) 6. 
13 B Schmidt and I Schröder, Introduction: Violent Imaginaries and Violent Practices in B Schmidt and I 
Schröder (eds) Anthropology of Violence and Conflict (Routledge, 2001) 1. 
14 G Simmel, The Sociology of Conflict: I (1903) 9 American Journal of Sociology 492. 
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formation it is first necessary to examine some of the processes of collective identity 
formation.   
 
 
One of Us? 
 
Identity derives from identidem, the contraction of the Latin expression of idem et idem, 
literally ‘same and same’ and it is in this perspective of identification that we come to see 
something as the same or similar.  Yet, in making that assessment there is a parallel, if 
unspoken assessment of difference.  How much two things are alike depends on how much 
difference can be tolerated and similarity still asserted? In many regards the assessment of 
similarity is relational, not absolute; what might be intolerable in one circumstance may be 
the basis of unity in another. For everyone, one of the first acts of self-identification is 
recognising the distinction between the infant-self and a distinct and separate parent.15  We 
recognise the distinction of our bodies, our own desires and needs and those of our parents 
and other family members and their friends.  This first move of recognising what Lacan 
phrases as the distinction between ‘I’ and ‘Not-I’ becomes extended to other social 
groupings: family/not-family; neighbourhood/not-neighbourhood; nation/not-nation.  These 
social groupings become the constellations of collective identity to which each individual 
belongs: race, gender, class, sexual orientation, religion, ethno-linguistic group and relevant 
intersections between these.  Each of us enjoys countless collective identities, some spatially 
oriented as in the example of a neighbourhood or housing estate, others are voluntary 
associations such as football clubs, or political organisation, but the attachment, emotional 
investment or cathexis is no less strong.  Moreover, the sum total of these collective identities 
and social groupings is one way by which each of us comes to define ourselves individually.  
We derive a sense of self-worth and value through our affiliations, or as Daniel Druckman 
put it: ‘Membership in a clan, religious group, or ethnic group, becomes part of the 
individual's self-identity and critical to a sense of self-worth.’ 16  As some of these 
identifications become attenuated and perhaps slip away altogether, we change, and yet that 
previous identification still marks us, whether as someone from the working class who now 
has found new riches and needs to negotiate the new social spaces and expectations that come 
with wealth, or as someone who once passionately rooted for one football team became 
disillusioned and now roots for another. We hold fast to those identities that continue to 
provide us with a sense of self-worth and perhaps severe ties, or no longer identify with those 
that do not.  Each of us can carry multiple perspectives and life experiences and our identities 
reflect that; our identities change, as identities are fluid, and our past identities inform our 
present and future ones. 
 
This flexible and fluid system of belonging has perils, however.  On the one hand, just as we 
remake our individual selves, groups too are constantly being made and remade.17 Groups are 
the totality of the individuals who identify with them and so as individuals come and go, join 
and fall away, are born and die, these groups change.  In a social sense we can think of 
collective identity as a process of dual ascription, each aspect being equally important.  
Firstly, individuals ascribe themselves to a particular group - self-ascription - and secondly 
the group makes a determination as to whether the individual belongs to the group or not -
                                                
15 Depressive position? 
16 D Druckman, Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social Psychological Perspective (1994) 38 
Mershon International Studies Review 49.  
17 F Dalal, The Paradox of Belonging (2009) 14 Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society 75. 
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ascription by the collective.18 That determination is often based on the assessment of a 
performance associated with the group.  Individual members of groups enact their identity in 
such a way that others will recognize these enactments.  They may include wearing certain 
articles of clothing, as say certain patterns of textiles or certain colours associated with one 
clan or another. In this way clothing becomes a text of identity, wherein what one chooses to 
wear comes to be seen as a performance of ascribed and desired identity.  ‘Dress plays the 
role of social rank, stamping a person as belonging to a certain corporate body and 
contraposing him to those who do not belong to it’.19 These acts may also include eating or 
not eating certain items, as the ‘consumption or rejection of particular kinds of food 
amalgamates people into a community to the degree that it separates them from other 
people’.20 Dietary restrictions, enforced or relaxed, represent an act of distinction.  Together 
with its function in social intercourse, literally bringing people together to commune, food 
also acts as social separation.  ‘All peoples have been known to have customs forbidding or 
restricting meals between certain groups of people, e.g. men and women, members of 
different castes, social classes, religions’.21 In this way, every community has its own set of 
values and norms.  Those who do not abide by them can expect some kind of social sanction.  
On the other hand, in order to demonstrate that one does belong, one must make these 
performances in accordance with expectations.  At other times the social demands for strict 
adherence may wane, rendering the distinction no longer relevant; or as previously 
communities join more closely together earlier acts of distinction may transform into what is 
perceived as shared activity.  These performances are taught and learned through 
socialisation and socially discursive processes, practiced again and again.  Vikki Bell 
describes this as the embodiment process:  ‘The production of the effect of identity, the effect 
(and affect) of various modes of affiliation, is an embodiment process’ whereby these 
affective effects shape individual everyday behaviour.22    
 
Lois McNay writing about Judith Butler’s definition of performativity, particularly as regards 
the construction and realisation of gender, suggests that it should not be seen as a ‘quasi-
permanent structure’, rather she writes that identity ‘should be thought of as a temporal 
regulation of socio-symbolic norms and practices, where the idea of the performative 
expresses both the cultural arbitrariness of the “performed” nature of…identity, and alas its 
deep inculcation in that every performance serves to re-inscribe [that identity] on the body’.23 
In this way we can think of identity as something that we do.  Karl Jung put it nicely stating 
that: ‘Not that you are, but that you do is the self.  The self appears in deeds and deeds always 
mean relationships’.24 As such, these performances are judged and evaluated within the 
structures of social relations to give them meaning and marking inclusion or exclusion to 
those relationships. In this way, no one is simply ‘of’ a group in some essentialist way; rather, 
                                                
18 JS Murer, Ethnic Conflict: An Overview of Analyzing and Framing Communal Conflicts from Comparative 
Perspectives (2012) 24 Terrorism and Political Violence 566; S Wallman, The Boundaries of Race: Processes of 
Ethnicity in England (1978) 13 Man 206, in D Hastings and TM Wilson, Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation 
and State (Berg, 2001) 22-23.  
19 BF Porshnev, Opposition as a Component of Ethnic Self-Consciousness, in LA Despres (ed) Ethnicity and 
Resource Competition in Plural Societies (Mouton Publisher, 1975) 141. 
20 Ibid, 141. 
21 Ibid, 141. 
22 V Bell, Performativity and Belonging: An Introduction in V Bell (ed) Performing and Belonging (Sage, 1999) 
8. 
23 L McNay, Subject, Psyche and Agency: The Work of Judith Butler in V Bell (ed) Performing and Belonging 
(Sage, 1999) 176. 
24 K Jung, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra: Notes on the Seminar Given 1934-1939, (Princeton University Press, 1988) 
73.  
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each individual must make performances of their identity to be acknowledged as members or 
non-members.  Put another way, Fredrik Barth wrote that the criteria by which ‘membership 
is signalled and the standards by which members are evaluated and judges are tied [together] 
in shared symbolic systems’.25 The symbolic systems set out those criteria upon which 
performances will be judged.  So, some performances might be sartorial in nature, as for 
example football fans look to see which jersey someone else might be wearing.  Declaring 
allegiance to one football team or another is performed through the shared symbolic systems 
of jerseys, hats and scarves.  Similarly, rival gang members might wear blue or red, as both 
sides understand the shared significance of wearing one colour or the other.  In just such a 
way Vamik Volkan described how when he was growing up in Cyprus fishermen would all 
wear sashes; this can be seen as a unifying distinction of Cypriot fishermen from other 
Mediterranean fishermen.  However, Greek Cypriots would wear blue sashes, whereas their 
Turkish Cypriot counterparts would wear red; and when sitting in cafés the Greek Cypriots 
would smoke cigarettes from blue packets and the Turkish Cypriots cigarettes from red, 
making it possible to see, upon entering the café, who was a Greek Cypriot and who was a 
Turkish Cypriot.26 But these acts of distinction could be the choice as to which language one 
speaks in, or perhaps even the pronunciation of a word such as the difference between the 
Croatian manner of saying milk mlijeko and the Serbian mleko.27  The significances of these 
distinctions are themselves relational.  What might be the tolerable dialectal variation in the 
common language of Serbo-Croatian at one time, might be the unacceptable marker of an 
enemy-other speaking “another language” in another instance, to be rendered insignificant or 
unimportant again, at a third time.  In this way it is not the performances themselves that 
render difference, but how they are understood in a social context that provides meaning.  It 
is the social construction of a boundary separating one group from another, where both sides 
understand the significance of that boundary.  An English traveller to Scotland notices the 
different pronunciation north of the borders but may not be able to distinguish between a 
Glaswegian and a Dundonian accent.  All three of these accents from the British Isles are 
different from the broad, flat American accents, yet they are all from the English language.  
The differences are very real, but it is not the different pronunciations that lead to war. The 
boundary is fluid and dynamic, changing with context, changing with time.  It is the 
boundary that represents the social significance of separation, not any one performance.  As 
Barth put it, ‘it is the boundary that defines a group not the cultural stuff it encloses’ and the 
group’s continuity is dependent on the maintenance of that boundary.28 Groups, whether 
small street crews or large ethnies stretching across multiple countries, are constantly being 
re-created in acts that construct and maintain the boundary between one group and another.  
So while groups are often spoken of in static or fixed term, especially ethnic groups or 
nationalities associated with particular qualities or activities likewise described in endless or 
permanent terms, ‘they are all nevertheless in some sense not only always “made”, but also 
                                                
25 F Barth, “Introduction” in F Barth (ed), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation of Cultural 
Difference (George Allen and Unwin, 1998 [1969]) 6.  
26 V Volkan, Individual and Large-Group Identities: Does Working with Borderline Patients Teach Us Anything 
about International Negotiations? Working Paper http://www.vamikvolkan.com/Ind%FDvidual-and-Large-
group-Identities%3A-Does-Working-with-Borderline-Patients-Teach-Us-Anything-About-International-
Negotiations-.php, 12 February 2014; V Volkan, Cyprus War and Adaptation: A Psychoanalytic History of Two 
Ethnic Groups in Conflict (University of Virginia Press, 1979); D Goleman, Amid Ethnic Wars, Psychiatrists 
Seek Roots of Conflicts (1994) The New York Times C13, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/02/science/amid-
ethnic-wars-psychiatrists-seek-roots-of-conflicts.html?src=pm&pagewanted=2, 14 February 2014.  
27  V Volkan, Large-group identity: ‘Us and them’ polarizations in the international arena (2009) 14 
Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society 11.   
28 F Barth op cit 15. 
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are continuously in a process of being made’.29 These social practices that maintain the 
boundaries are themselves also in parallel processes of dynamic change through 
interpretation, performance, reinterpretation and transmission.   
 
One consequence of this ceaseless process of groups making and remaking themselves 
through the constant redefinition of the border is the recognition that in the act of inclusion 
there is a parallel act of exclusion.  While those included within a group can feel secure in the 
inclusion in the group, there is an underlying anxiety regarding the possibility of being 
excluded in another instance.  This tension, or what Dalal calls the ‘paradox of belonging’,30 
represents both the possibility of the boundary shifting in the future such that one may not be 
included, or that a performance may be judged to be inadequate or defective in such a way as 
to no longer warrant inclusion.   On the one hand, large group identities not only provide self-
worth, as described above, but also provide a sense of security along with the sense of 
belonging.  ‘People experience levels of security in relation to their own and other’s 
perceptions of their structural position’ within the group.31 This inter-subjective engagement 
of self-presentation and group reception constitutes this dynamic process of reproducing, 
retransmitting and interpreting group values, norms, traditions and customs.  The internalised 
self-conceptions of the quality of group performances are only realised in their public 
presentation.  It is in this moment that anxiety often arises regarding the adequacy of the 
performances.  So, on the other hand, the very acts that demonstrate membership and which 
should provide a sense of security through belonging in a large group, are also the very same 
acts that are judged and may in the end be the basis for exclusion if the performances are 
deemed insufficient or defective.     
 
Norbert Elias described these fast moving, shifting sands of identity in his historic essay ‘The 
Civilising Process’, in which he suggests it is not enough to study a single element of a group 
to stand for the whole.  Rather, Elias argues that in order to understand a group it is necessary 
to examine the social relationships between various elements of the group and the shifts 
within the power relations and balances between these various sub-elements within the group.    
The social structures and social processes ‘demand a study of the relationships between the 
different fundamental strata that are bound together within a social field, and which, with the 
slower or more rapid shifts of power relationships arising from the specific structure of the 
field, are for a time reproduced over and over again’.32 The changes in the social structures 
do not originate in one class or element or another, but arise in conjunction with the tensions 
between the different functional groups in a social field.  In this way different elements are 
competing to define the whole.  Those who may not agree or refuse to engage in the 
demanded performances associated with the new definition of the group may then be 
expelled or, at least, no longer considered members and at most may become the targets of 
violence.  While groups are often analysed in terms of the shifts within the ruling strata, it is 
also important to examine how other strata accept or do not accept new definitions of identity 
performance.  These performances vary from the reproduction of original myth narratives, to 
articulating the group’s history as a specific sequence of significant moments, to engaging in 
acts of violence.  This dynamism is the contestation of power and status among different 
strata within a given group.  Whether activities said to define the group through ritual 
                                                
29 F Dalal, op cit 75. 
30 Ibid 
31 C Kinvall, Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security 
(2004) 25 Political Psychology 749.  
32 N Elias, The Civilizing Process in J Goudsblom and S Mennell (eds) The Norbert Elias Reader (Wiley-
Blackwell, 1997) 65.  
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performance change is dependent upon the power of elements within the group to actualise 
this change, and to persuade, coax, or even coerce others to emulate the change.  One way to 
conceive of this realisation of power is through Pierre Bourdieu’s notions of social and 
cultural capital. 
    
 
Violent Performances and Social Capital 
 
For Bourdieu, like Elias and Barth, social networks are not given or natural but must be made 
through the active investment of time, energy, attention and effort to solidify group relations 
in such a way as to render them as a resource for all the members.  Social networks and social 
groups are created through the efforts and energy put in to them and the sum total of that 
effort and energy becomes a resource for the entire group.  A given group’s strength can be 
measured in the quality of the solidarity of the group and likewise the solidary of the group 
becomes one of its strengths.  Bourdieu wrote that ‘the profits which accrue from 
membership in a group are the basis of the solidarity which makes them possible.’33 In this 
way we can think of social spaces as being constructed of different types of resources, power 
being one of them.  Bourdieu refers to these social spaces as ‘social fields’, which are ‘areas 
of structured socially-patterned activity of “practice”’.34  These social fields are organised 
around everyday practices, assumptions, expectations, protocols, characteristic behaviours 
and most of all self-sustaining values.  The totality of these practices in a given field 
Bourdieu refers to as “habitus”.  Richard Terdiman suggests that for Bourdieu ‘a field is like 
a magnet exerting a force on all those that come within its range, but those who experience 
these “pulls” are generally not aware of its source’.35   The field is both the rules of the game 
and the environment in which the game is played and those playing the game socially hold 
the rules collectively. Bourdieu does uphold the possibility of becoming socially conscious 
and reflexive about one’s own position within a given field, and even to move between fields.  
Developing what Erving Goffman called ‘a sense of one’s place’ is the social mastery of the 
social field, both its “objective side” of structures and institutions and its ‘subjective side’ of 
social prohibitions, taboos, mores, moral and values. ‘The sense of one’s place, as a sense of 
what one can or cannot “permit oneself” implies a tacit acceptance of one’s place, a sense of 
limits or a sense of distances to be marked, kept, respected or expected.’36 We can think of 
this ‘sense of one’s place’ as a sense of position within the group and an assessment of the 
relative power or capital possessed or accrued by a given actor within that field.   Each field 
or sub-field corresponds to a particular arrangement of forms of capital, whereby a social 
field can be described as the multi-dimensional space of positions where actors are 
distributed according to the overall amount of the capital or power each possesses, according 
to the arrangement and priorities of the composition or combination of the various forms of 
capital.  For Bourdieu, each social field is distinguished by the composition of four forms of 
power or capital: economic, cultural, social and symbolic, the last being the ability to render 
the other forms fungible such that accumulations in one form can be transformed into 
another.   While Bourdieu emphasises the potential fungibility of the forms, each possesses 
its own dynamics and expectations, ‘and relative to economic exchange they are 
                                                
33 P Bourdieu, The forms of capital in JG Richards (ed) Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of 
Education (Greenwood, 1985) 249 in A Portes, Social Capital: Its Origins and Application in Modern Sociology 
(1998) 24 Annual Review of Sociology 3.  
34 R Terdiman, Translator’s Introduction to P Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical 
Field (1986) 38 The Hastings Law Journal 805. 
35 Ibid, p.806. 
36 P Bourdieu, The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups (1985) 14 Theory and Society 728. 
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characterised by less transparency and uncertainty.’37  For example, social capital obligations 
and debts are repaid in forms different to the way in which they were acquired.  Social capital 
transactions are not quid prop quo and are often characterised by the uncertain time horizons 
associated with generalised reciprocity.38     
 
The mastery of group expectations regarding the ability to engage in the most appropriate 
behaviour valorised by the group in any given situation becomes the means of accumulating 
social and cultural capital.   However, the field in which a given actor is concerned might be 
very local indeed.  So, while norms and expectations of a larger group may be violated, the 
violations themselves may constitute acquiescence to another set of values and norms, a more 
local habitus.39  In this regard, some actors may in fact accumulate social capital by violating 
norms of a larger group, as they are abiding to local expectations.  If social capital can be 
seen as an embodied state of power, the ability to set expectation and norms - to contribute to 
the establishment of habitus, realised in practice - is a formidable social force.  Habitus is 
that which governs and dictates practice, made and remade through practice, but is largely 
invisible or unnoticed within the social field it governs.  This is symbolic power.  ‘It is the 
power to make groups by making the “common sense”, the explicit consensus of the whole 
group’.40 Since status is afforded to those who best embody the values of the group, those 
that exhibit, embody and transmit the attributes of “common sense” will gain more status.  If 
performing acts of violence is “common sense” in certain situations for actors in a given 
social field, then those who anticipate the context in which violence is expected, and become 
well versed in the nuances of the expected manner of such performance, will ultimately 
accumulate social capital.  The symbolic struggle over the production of “common sense” is 
the struggle to impose what is seen as the legitimate vision of the social world. 
 
One can easily imagine a small neo-Nazi group somewhere in Europe.  For this group, 
expressing anti-Semitism and anti-Roma sentiments becomes a way of demonstrating 
membership in the group and reproducing group values.  Further, those who are “better” at 
making these expressions, accrue greater amounts of social capital. So, while these 
expressions would be seen as anti-social in most European contexts, within the group the 
expressions are the means to accumulating social capital.  The greatest expression of social 
power would be to set forth the criteria and perhaps determine the content by which others in 
                                                
37 A Portes, Social Capital: Its Origins and Application in Modern Sociology (1998) 24 Annual Review of 
Sociology 4. 
38 A cinematic example of such a transaction occurs in the opening scenes of Francis Ford Coppola’s The 
Godfather, when the character of Vito Corleone says to Bonasera ‘You were afraid to be in my debt…’. After 
Bonasera agrees to call Corleone “Godfather”, they enter into a social relationship of power, and of debt and 
obligation.  Bonasera acquires a debt by asking for an action, to which Corleone says ‘Some day, and that day 
may never come, I will call upon you to do a service for me, but until that day accept this [agreement for action] 
as a gift on my daughter’s wedding day.’  Here we can see the complexity of social capital, where reciprocity is 
completely unspecified as an undefined “service”; the time horizon is likewise opaque as reciprocity may come 
“some day”, and moreover, the principle of reciprocity itself is denied as “that day may never come” and at 
present the social act that otherwise would be accrued as a debt is to be regarded as a gift.  The very act of 
subordination in Bonasera’s calling Corleone “Godfather” creates Corleone’s social capital.     
39 Robert Putnam, who offers his own definition of social capital, sees its accumulation in largely normative 
terms.  Accumulating social capital is good.  But in so professing, Putnam does not associate “bad” behaviours 
with social capital accumulation.  He equates social capital with civic engagement, and those communities 
without what he sees as proper civic engagements, such as the areas of Calabria and Sicily in Italy where the so-
called mafia are active, as incivisme, or uncivil, suggesting that these are not sites of social capital accumulation.  
See R Putnam, The prosperous community: social capital and public life (1993) 13 American Prospect 36. 
40 P Bourdieu, The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups (1985) 14 Theory and Society 729. 
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the group will judge identity performances.  Choosing the texts, and perhaps writing the 
slogans to be repeated by the group, would be demonstrative of this symbolic power.   
 
Bourdieu wrote of this symbolic power as the power to construct reality, to establish a 
gnoseological order, realising Foucault’s or Durkheim’s idea of “knowledge power.”  For 
Durkheim this knowledge power represented a logical conformity, creating within a group a 
“homogenous conception of time, space, number, and causes”.41  These unifying perspectives 
make possible a consensus of how the world is and how it works; and it is with this common 
sense of the world that a social order is produced.  This common perspective is present as a 
universal interest at least to the whole group, if not to the entire world.  Paradoxically, this 
“united” vision itself becomes the basis for distinction, as those who do not share this 
common sense world view are seen as defective and must be excluded from at least the 
group, if not the world.  This becomes one of the means of de-humanising the other, by 
which those who do not conform to this “common sense” of the world may be deemed to not 
be worthy of it, and therefore become legitimate targets for violence.  Thus, the dominant 
elements within a group through the articulation of a common culture or a fictitious 
integration of the group as a whole are able to neutralise any alternate perspectives from 
those within the group with less status by asserting the legitimacy of the established order, 
through the establishment of distinctions and the legitimation of those distinctions.  ‘The 
dominant culture produces its specific ideological effect by concealing its function of 
division (or the creation of hierarchies) under its function of communication; the culture 
unites, separates and legitimates distinction by defining all culture in terms of their distance 
from the dominant culture’.42  One of the most important advantages that accompanies this 
ability to divide the world through the act of describing the world – imposing distinctions 
through the articulation of definitions – is that the acceptance or the normalisation of these 
distinctions becomes the source of legitimation and status of those that articulate the 
definitions.  Just as Judith Butler describes the enactment of gender definitions as the ‘forced 
reiteration of norms’, these embodiments are the realisation of the power of the ‘compulsory 
and constraining idea that impels and sustains [this] identity’.43 That is, each submission to 
the discursive power of the norm becomes not only a validation of that power but is itself a 
realisation of the power and the means of its reproduction and retransmission.  Bourdieu 
observed this in one of his earlier works when he wrote that: ‘the power of words and 
commands, the power of words to give order and bring order, lies in the belief in the 
legitimacy of the words and the person who utters them, a belief which words themselves 
cannot produce’.44 It is in this elementary power to name that we can see the fundamental 
power of distinction: the power to exclude and to render that exclusion as “common sense” 
and the power to declare that it has always been thus.   
 
Violence in the formation of identity is not reactionary in the way that it is most often thought 
of, negatively, but is defensive and constructive.  The violence of exclusion can be world 
making and can shape and reshape identities through the construction of ‘a world of rules, 
rights, regimes, and people in imagined communities.’45 Building on the work of Julia 
                                                
41 P Bourdieu, Symbolic Power (1979) 4 Critique of Anthropology 79. 
42 Ibid, 80. 
43 J Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex (Routledge, 1993) 94. 
44 P Bourdieu, Le langage autorisé. Note sur les conditions sociales de l’efficacité du discours ritual (1975) 5-6 
Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 183-90 in P Bourdieu, Symbolic Power (1979) 4 Critique of 
Anthropology 83.  
45 G Bowman, The Violence in Identity in B Schmidt and I Schröder (eds) Anthropology of Violence and 
Conflict (Routledge, 2001) 42. 
 11 
Kristeva, I have written elsewhere, that vulnerable group identities can be made secure 
through the violent expulsion of “untrustworthy” elements, redefining the collective whole, 
denying the relationship to the destabilising elements and using violence against those 
expelled as a unifying performative act, joining together the newly reimagined collective self 
in a common understanding of distinction: this distinction has always been thus.46 The 
boundary between those included in the newly redefined self, and those expelled into the 
status of being other is characterised by profound violence, for the boundary is a rigid 
prohibition preventing the once unified self and other, included and excluded from merging 
into one another.  These acts of violence signal to each side of the boundary the position of 
the actor, the performance of which will be judged, potentially by others on both sides of the 
border, to confirm the status of belonging.     
 
 
Violence Triangles 
 
The popular conception of violence is of an act of harm between two people: a perpetrator 
and a victim.  This depiction as a singular, instantaneous act between two people empties 
violence of all its contexts: history, spatiality, normativity and sociability.  Slavoj Žižek 
suggests in the introduction to his volume on violence that the “overpowering horror” of 
violent acts creates an empathy with the “victim” that makes it difficult to explore the 
motivations and justifications of the “perpetrator”.47 However, David Riches provided a new 
perspective, long anticipating Žižek’s criticism regarding the “sympathy” for a “victim” and 
the antipathy expressed toward a “perpetrator”.  Riches suggested that one think of the 
perpetrator as a “performer” of violent acts and that these performances are directed toward a 
“target” rather than a victim.  This is a rather important shift, as in many situations the targets 
of violence are often the perpetrators of violence themselves, whether they be mutual 
combatants in a formally declared military conflict or members of rival gang street gangs.  
Further, Riches suggested that there is a third perspective to the social practices of violence, 
that of a witness.48  Vittorio Bufacchi found Riches’ formulation of this triadic relationship to 
be too relativistic, whereby the legitimacy of a given performance of violence depends on the 
relative perspective of the performer, target or witness.  He wanted to provide a more 
impartial perspective, suggesting that reconceptualization of the “witness” to be a “spectator 
that is able to provide an impartial perspective and an objective assessment of the 
perpetration of violence.49  I would like to offer a different alternative, one that realigns the 
violence triangle more closely to the one envisioned by Michel Foucault, who saw the three 
points of intersection as the “sovereign, the victim and the audience”. 50  Riches and 
Bufacchi’s triangles both centre on a primary relationship similar to the common dyadic 
approach to violence, where the witness or the spectator appear as separate, or perhaps 
neutral, third-parties who observes an act of violence and adjudicates its legitimacy post hoc.   
I would like to suggest a triangle of performer, target and audience, in which the primary 
relationship is between the performer and the audience.  The performer is not merely 
concerned with whether the audience will see the act of violence as legitimate or not, but 
                                                
46 JS Murer, Constructing the enemy-other: Anxiety, trauma and mourning in the narratives of political conflict 
(2009) 14 Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society 109-130; JS Murer, Institutionalizing enemies: The 
consequences of reifying projection in post-conflict environments (2010) 15 Psychoanalysis, Culture and 
Society 1-19.  
47 S Žižek, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections (Routledge, 2009) 3. 
48 D Riches, The Phenomenon of Violence in D Riches (ed) The Anthropology of Violence (Basil-Blackwell, 
1986) 8. 
49 V Bufacchi, Violence and Social Justice (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007) 33-34, and see n7 on page 47. 
50 M Foucault, Discipline and Punish (Pantheon, 1977) 68.   
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rather the audience is making a determination as to whether the act conforms to the collective 
norms and values as embodied in social capital.   
 
One can easily imagine a scenario in which a young man walking down the street with other 
members of his street crew, the Blues, encounters a person symbolically signalling 
membership in a rival gang, the Reds.  In the violent imaginary of the Blues street crew, there 
is no question of the moral superiority of the position of the Blues and the polarised 
relationship between “Us” and “Them”. There is no ambiguity as to the legitimacy of the use 
of violence against the “threatening-rival-enemy.”  In this encounter with the rival-other, our 
young man’s primary social concern is not with the Red, but with his social standing and 
status among his social-peer Blues.  He then pulls a knife and attacks the rival member of the 
Reds. The relationship between the performer of the violence and the target is largely a 
structural one, whereas the relationship between the performer and the audience is a social 
and inter-subjective one.  In this case, violence is not maladaptive or anti-social, but rather is 
expected and constitutes the means to obtaining or accruing further social capital.  All too 
often analysts focus too much attention on the use of violence as an instrumental means to 
some specific end vis-à-vis the target or the victim.  But in this example we can see that it is 
not the consequence of the violence that is important; that is, the outcome between the 
performer of the violent act and the target is relatively unimportant. Rather, it is the act itself 
that is important to the performer and the audience.  It is not necessarily to kill or eliminate 
the other as a consequential act, but rather simply to act against the other. In this environment 
of permissive violence, or what Norbert Elias called a “culture of violent solutions”,51 to not 
participate in violence, or to not abide by the norms of the group regarding the fantasy of 
what to do when encountering a member of the “threatening-rival-other” is to expose oneself 
to the potential of social sanction, isolation, or even to become a target of violence one’s self.  
Conversely, Richard Felson suggests that violence becomes a routine activity, whereby those 
engaged in a culture of violent solutions seek out conflict, or put themselves in places where 
they expect a conflict to occur, so that conflicts may occur between like-minded members of 
various street groups, each of which understands that acts of violence are the stepping stones 
along the path of obtaining ever greater social capital.52               
 
Additionally, with this restructured violence triangle that focuses on the relationship between 
performer and audience, it is possible to imagine a scenario in which the target and the 
audience are from the same group, rather than the performer and audience sharing an identity.  
Here again, rather than being impartial or “objective” as explicitly stated in Bufacchi’s 
model, the “accessible, easily perceivable, easily understood” communication of violence53 is 
intended to convey a message beyond the body or the symbolic site of the target and is to be 
perceived by the audience.  This is similar to the communicative aspect of terrorism as 
described by Schmid and Graaf, where the target is selected by the terrorist-performer for the 
maximum resonance with the audience.54 The positions within this triangle are relational, as 
is suggested in Riches’ original formulation.  Yet, there is no privileged position somehow 
outside of the conduct of the violence, as suggested by Bufacchi.  Additionally, it is possible 
                                                
51 JR Kurtz and J Turpin, Untangling the Web of Violence in JR Kurtz and J Turpin (eds) The Web of Violence: 
From Interpersonal to Global (University of Illinois, 1997), 209. 
52 S Zdun, Violence in Street Culture: Cross Cultural Comparisons of Youth Groups and Criminal Gangs (2008) 
119 New Directions for Youth Development 43. 
53 D Riches, The Phenomenon of Violence in D Riches (ed) The Anthropology of Violence (Basil-Blackwell, 
1986) 11. 
54 AP Schmid and J de Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media 
(Sage, 1982). 
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for a single individual to occupy any of the three positions: not simultaneously, but in 
succession.  Teresa Koloma Beck likewise suggests a triangle of performer, target and 
observed, in which the roles are not fixed but constitute changeable modes of experiencing 
violence.  Beck argues that violence is experiences as a pain that is distinct from that as a 
result of fate or hazard, for the pain of violence was inflicted to deliberately enforce the will 
of one against another.55  I would agree with Beck and suggest the audience member who 
experiences the pain of losing a loved one due to violence aimed at a difference target indeed 
experiences a pain distinct from that of mere accident.  For the pain was experienced in the 
environment of violent solutions, even if the target was not itself specifically aimed at, or 
even a party to the conflict.   
 
This is not dissimilar to Ivana Maček’s triadic model regarding the perception of the violence 
of armed conflict.  Based on her field research conducted in Sarajevo during the siege of the 
Bosnian war, Maček argues that one’s perception of the violence depends on one’s subject 
position, of which she posits that there are three: civilian, soldier, or deserter.56  Maček 
suggests that often one individual would experience the violence from each of the subject 
positions and that the quality of that experience was fundamentally different depending on 
the subject position.  In this regard, members of the same large-group who share a collective 
identity constellation may yet have different subject positions that require intra-group 
reconciliation to make sense of the violence.       
 
 
Violence as Group Value 
 
Elias’ “culture of violent solutions” does not mean that everyone in the group will be violent, 
nor does it even mean that the most violent members of the group will be violent all of the 
time; it does however, mean that a violent imaginary is at the centre of the group’s self-
conception.57 This violent imaginary is a shared worldview for all the members of the group.  
Yet, the vast majority of the literature on radicalisation, or political and social mobilisation 
outside of the mainstream, focuses on men.  The association of radicalisation or radical 
politics to violence moves such politics into the sphere of masculinity and masculine 
performance.  However, some of these performances are also performances of belonging, 
demonstrations of group norms or articulations of group values.  In this regard, holding 
similar views, or expressing similar sentiments to that of the rest of the group becomes the 
very means of expressing group identity and membership. Even the most outlandish 
articulation of racial hate and exclusion can be the means of binding a group together. Sini 
Perho has described such processes while writing about skinhead groups in Finland, but these 
groups are not exclusively composed of young men or boys, but include girlfriends, sisters, 
mothers, wives and partners.  In such groups “being racists links young people into a 
community, giving them a feeling of solidarity and belonging to something.”58 A shift of the 
analytic focus on belonging to group performances would suggest that we find similar 
articulations by all group members regardless of their personal experience; that is, if the 
                                                
55 TK Beck, The Eye of the Beholder: Violence as a Social Process (2011) 5 International Journal of Conflict 
and Violence 353. 
56 I Maček, Predicament of war: Sarajevo experiences and ethics of war in B Schmidt and I Schröder (eds) 
Anthropology of Violence and Conflict (Routledge, 2001) 197-223. This article was developed in to a full book.  
See I Maček, Sarajevo Under Siege: Anthropology in Wartime (Pennsylvania, 2009).  
57 JR Kurtz and J Turpin, Untangling the Web of Violence in JR Kurtz and J Turpin (eds) The Web of Violence: 
From Interpersonal to Global (University of Illinois, 1997), 209. 
58 S Perho, Boys’ and Girls’ position in a Racist Milieu in L Suurpää and T Hoikkala (eds) Masculinities and 
Violence in Youth Culture (Finnish Youth Research Network, 2005) 49. 
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collectivity portrays itself as being deprived of resources that other groups have access to, 
individuals identifying with the group will articulate similar expressions of deprivation, 
regardless of their individual material circumstance.  The identification with deprivation is a 
group value, and is held strongly, irrespective of personal experience.  There is no conflict 
because the expression is one of belonging to the group, not an account of personal 
experience.  This was found with respect to violence through the European Study of Youth 
Mobilisation.  
 
From March of 2008 through October 2010 the European Study of Youth Mobilisation 
interviewed more than 800 young people who saw themselves outside of mainstream politics 
in five cities in Central Europe - Bratislava, Brno, Budapest, Krakow and Warsaw, in 
addition to holding workshops with more than 250 academics, police practitioners, local 
authorities, community activists and government representatives from across Nordic Europe 
to compare their experiences in working with violent youths mobilized from the radical right, 
radical left and environmental movements, as well as street gangs and religious cults.59  
 
ESYM afforded a rare opportunity to explore a comparison of group value articulations by 
gender, for unlike most studies that focus on the behaviours associated with men or boys, 
ESYM had no gender criteria.  Young men and women who were interviewed were not given 
instructions or selection criteria for the referral of the next respondents, save that the person 
referred was someone with whom the interviewee regularly engaged in politics, whether as 
conversation, debate or action.  The surprising consequence was near-gender equality across 
the study as a whole and across the groups within the study.60   
 
Remarkably, throughout the ESYM there is tremendous similarity between the response of 
women and men on a whole host of questions.  Most striking are the very similar responses 
regarding political expression and the legitimacy of violence.  On aggregate, recognizing that 
not the same number of men and women answered every question, the distribution of 
women’s responses mirrors that of the men.  This is perhaps most obvious and interesting in 
articulations regarding feelings of intimidation, the inability to adequately express oneself, 
being harassed, or thinking that violence is justified.   
 
For example, when each of the 421 participants from Budapest were asked if each as 
individuals thought that force could be justifiable in local politics, 30 men and 26 women 
responded that they believed “a great deal so”, indicating so by choosing 7-points out of 
seven. Most of those respondents were supporters of the Hungarian far-right political party 
Jobbik and it was the women who expressed this sentiment more frequently.  19 of 25 Jobbik 
women and 15 of 24 Jobbik men individually thought that force could be justified, at the 
level of seven out of seven.  The remaining fourteen agreed at levels 5 and 6.  When asked 
what they though the other members in group thought, 24 of the 25 women and 22 of the 24 
men from Jobbik thought that the rest of the group also believes that physical force may be 
necessary.  That is, 46 of the 49 Jobbik supporters answered by giving a 7 on a seven-point 
scale to indicate that they thought “my friends think force is necessary at times”. 
 
Although the obverse might be less convincing, 21 of 32 Radical Socialist men and 17 of the 
20 Radical Socialist women agreed that force is “not at all” justifiable, as did 18 of the 22 
                                                
59 See British Council, The European Study of Youth Mobilisation Report; Listening to Radicals: Attitudes and 
Motivations of Young People Engaged in Political and Social Movements Outside of the Mainstream in Central 
and Nordic Europe (British Council, 2011). 
60 Ibid, 11. 
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Ethnic Jewish men and 16 of the 18 Jewish women.  On aggregate the responses from men 
and women again mirror each other closely.  Below is a table of all of the responses from 
Budapest to the question “To what extent do you agree with the statement: My friends think 
physical force is necessary at times”? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Budapest responses to ESYM Questionnaire Number 62 
My friends think physical force is necessary at times. 
 Women Men 
Not at all = 1 68 64 
2 37 43 
3 29 29 
4 28 27 
5 13 12 
6 07 07 
Great Deal = 7 30 27 
Total: 212 209 
         
Table 2 
Responses to ESYM Questionnaire Number 62 for Jobbik and Ethnic Jewish Activists  My#friends#think#physical#force#is#necessary#at#times.#Group#Members# Not#at#All#(1)# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6# Very#Much#(7)# Totals#Male#Jobbik#supporters# 0# 0# 0# 0# 1# 1# 22# 24#Female#Jobbik#Supporters# 0# 0# 0# 1# 0# 0# 24# 25#Male#Ethnic#Jewish#Activists# 14# 2# 1# 3# 1# 0# 0# 22#Female#Ethnic#Jewish#Activists# 13# 1# 1# 0# 2# 1# 0# 18#Totals# 27# 3# 2# 4# 4# 2# 46# 89#
 
Table 3 
Responses to ESYM Questionnaire Number 64 for Jobbik and Ethnic Jewish Activists  If#the#government#will#not#listen#to#a#community#force#may#be#required#to#gain#attention#Group#Members# Not#at#All#(1)# 2# 3# 4# 5# 6# Very#Much#(7)# Totals#Male#Jobbik#supporters# 0# 0# 0# 0# 0# 6# 18# 24#Female#Jobbik#Supporters# 0# 0# 0# 2# 0# 4# 19# 25#Male#Ethnic#Jewish#Activists# 18# 2# 0# 2# 0# 0# 0# 22#Female#Ethnic#Jewish#Activists# 14# 2# 0# 0# 0# 0# 2# 18#Totals# 32# 4# 0# 4# 0# 10# 39# 89#
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When the ten combined questions61 relating to the use of violence and physical force are 
amalgamated in a scale there is even greater similarity demonstrated between the responses 
of men and that of women.  
 
 
Figure 1 
Budapest Violence Scale by Gender of Respondent 
 
 
In the graph above it is possible to see the tight alignment between the male and female 
positions on the use of violence for all of the groups, save for the radical socialists and the 
Baptists. The very tight alignment between male and female respondents among Jobbik 
supporters is well demonstrated by the lines overlapping.  In the parallel graph from 
Bratislava and Brno it is possible to see a divergence of opinion between men and women 
                                                
61 The items included in the scale were: 
1) If the government will not listen or respond to the people or a specific community physical force may 
be required to get the government’s attention. 
2) I think that violence is justifiable at times in local politics. 
3) My friends think violence is necessary at times. 
4) When the police approach a peaceful demonstration with riot gear on it is justifiable to throw stones at 
them. 
5) Physical force in the act of resisting the police, even when directed against the police is justifiable. 
6) The world is becoming a more violent place. 
7) People who use violence against the government have reasons to do so. 
8) The use of violence by some groups is seen as more legitimate than if used by other groups.  
9) My group would be legitimate in resisting against the police if it needed to do so. 
10) To what extent do you believe that physical force is justifiable in an effort to change a government or 
governmental system? 
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associated with the far-left and the earth defence movements. Opinions begin to converge 
with the gay/feminist activists and grow more closely as one moves toward the right end of 
the political spectrum.     
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Bratislava/ Brno Violence Scale 
 
     
Thirty-nine of the forty-nine Jobbik members expressed that they believed that force was 
justifiable in local politics by answering seven on the seven point scale, and 47 out of 49 
similarly answered ‘very much’ by selecting seven out of seven to agree that physical force is 
necessary in resisting the police. Likewise, 48 out of 49 agreed ‘very much’ to the 
proposition that “the world is becoming a more violent place.”  The 49th member agreed at 
the level of six out of seven.  Finally, 48 out of 49 Jobbik members agreed that ‘people who 
use violence against the government have reason to do so.’62  
 
The findings of the ESYM have two significant implications.  The first is that group values 
are held collectively. If one does not believe in these values, the dissenting individuals will be 
asked to leave in one way or another.  The second, perhaps more important, implication of 
the findings is that men and women see violence similarly within the same group.  The value 
is held over the group irrespective of gender.63 Expressing shared values is one way of 
performing belonging and identification with a group. This is no less true of tolerating or 
                                                
62 In this case the 49th Jobbik member did not provide an answer.   
63 As can be seen in Figure 5 there was a divergence among the left-wing activists in Bratislava and Brno. 
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even expecting or endorsing violence as a group value.  Elias’ “culture of violent solutions” 
is an expression of these shared values.    
 
These “cultures of violent solutions” can be microenvironments on to themselves.  That is, 
they may be sub-cultures within larger cultural environments that do not value violence in the 
same fashion.  In looking to violent solutions to solve social problems, participants may 
actually gain status within the group and within the micro “culture” even if the action 
conflicts with broader social norms.  For example, in a different study a respondent from 
Glasgow told us that his father encouraged him to carry a knife.  He was also encouraged by 
his father to fight.  This was largely an expression of sticking up for himself, to demonstrate 
his self-esteem and that he was not to be bullied or taken advantage.  He was encouraged to 
carry a knife because ‘all the other fathers carried knives when they were young and are 
telling their boys now the same story.’64 On the one hand, the father’s advice is rather 
practical; if everyone carries a knife, perhaps it is best to not be the only one unarmed. On the 
other hand it is the reinforcement of the neighbourhood’s habitus.  For those people who find 
themselves marginalised by the larger mainstream culture the pursuit of social capital within 
the local micro-cultural groups provides an alternative for achieving social status.  Adherence 
to the group norms affords an opportunity for social capital accumulation and social mobility 
that would not otherwise be available to those that do poorly under the terms of hegemonic 
social capital accumulation schemes.  In this way, adherence to local practices, even when 
out of line with dominant or hegemonic practices in the larger society remains an important 
means of obtaining social recognition.  If violence is regularly reinforced, if it is seen as a 
valued practice, then it will be the means of obtaining social capital and status within the 
local group.  The exclusion of those who measure status through a counter-hegemonic or 
local system of disposition from larger society only goes to reinforce the desirability to 
remain in the alternate frame.   
 
 
Belonging before Believing: A Conclusion 
 
To better understand violence it is necessary to explore what violence does.  It is not only an 
action of destruction but also an action of creation.  It joins groups; it creates loyalty.  It 
becomes the realisation and the demonstration of belonging. Recognition and social 
integration are realised through the acceptance of social group norms.65  If violence as the 
means of conflict resolution is valued as a group norm, then committing violence can be seen 
as the means of developing social capital with a view to increasing social status.  This was a 
theme repeated by many respondents in the ESYM and was articulated well by a self-
described earth liberation activist in Brno, Czech Republic; as regards belonging to his group, 
he said: ‘You are not invisible; you can do something, gain respect – you can be someone.’ A 
respondent to the Violence Report by the Violence Prevention Network expressed a similar 
sentiment: ‘I get noticed when I use violence; I have a feeling of power and superiority.’66 
This is not something to achieve an end, but rather is an experience in and of itself.  This is 
particularly important for young people who feel excluded from other avenues of social status 
attainment.  A former neo-Nazi in Stockholm told his story of being an outsider at school 
because he had reading difficulties, yet once inside the White Power Movement he could 
                                                
64 Author interview, St Andrew, Scotland, October 14, 2011. 
65 W Heitmeyer and A Reimund, Disintegration, Recognition, and Violence: A Theoretical Perspective in W. 
Heitmeyer and S Legge (eds), Youth, Violence and Social Disintegration (Jossey-Bass Publishers: 2008) 25-38. 
66 See S Zdun, Violence in Street Culture: Cross Cultural Comparisons of Youth Groups and Criminal Gangs 
(2008) 119 New Directions for Youth Development 43. 
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become a leader.  He could not do well at school, but he could be violent and be good at 
being violent. This provided him a sense of self-worth, which was then reinforced by the 
group.67  
 
These performances of violence can also function as a test of an individual’s depth of 
attachment to the group. A self-described neo-Nazi respondent told the ESYM that ‘violence 
is the initial phase you must go through to become a member, and that you must return to [in 
order] to be [seen as] active.’  Violence therefore can function as a commitment.  It is a 
commitment of the body and it is a commitment to the group.  One defends the group as a 
whole, upholds the values and ethos of the group and most importantly individual members 
feel that they are both are recognized and that they can recognize each other.  In the context 
of “cultures of violent solutions” every challenge demands an aggressive reaction to defend 
one’s reputation. Such challenges demand both the defence of the collective’s reputation and 
the opportunity to make a performance on behalf of the group; the opportunity to do the 
group proud. It is in this moment that an actor displays his group identity and makes a 
performance that distinguishes him from the challenger, or a non-aligned bystander.  In this 
way multiple group members can experience a slight or act of disrespect on behalf of another 
group member.  It is not only the direct slight or perceived challenge that demands action; it 
is the experience of group identity to experience a challenge collectively as a shared 
experience of group cohesion. ‘It is very much, you hit my friend and I hit your friend’.68 As 
a radical Earth liberation activist told the ESYM group: violence provides the ‘feeling that 
someone will stand up for you.’  This feeling is particularly important for those who feel 
otherwise left out or excluded.  This violent imaginary unties the group, as the violence is the 
border between group-self and enemy-other. The imagination that someone would stand up 
for me provides me with a sense of security, which I can reciprocate in my own fantasy of 
defending someone in the group.  However, not participating in the violence that defines the 
group can expose the one who refuses to social isolation or even becoming the target of 
violence himself.69  
 
John Pitts writes that what prompts many of the young people that he has met in the field to 
join a gang or engage in gang violence was the concern of becoming a target of that violence: 
‘gang affiliation was prompted, first and foremost by a concern for personal safety’.70 The 
lack of an affiliation can be at the root of insecurity, whether that affiliation is with a gang or 
some other social structure.  For those who appear to not be afforded protection by other 
social organisations, gang affiliation may be an important alternative.  But this consideration 
is as much existential as it is practical and as much about an ontological security of belonging 
as it is immediate physical security of being. It is through the consideration of ontological 
security that we can see how these considerations of gangs link back to considerations for 
ethnies or other status groups.  
 
In cases of ethnic conflict or other conflicts between status groups - clan-based conflicts, or 
conflicts regarding religious affiliation, race or class -- those whose identities are ambiguous 
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Violence (Routledge, 2011) 55-71. 
69 S Zdun, Violence in Street Culture: Cross Cultural Comparisons of Youth Groups and Criminal Gangs (2008) 
119 New Directions for Youth Development 39. 
70 J Pitts, Reluctant Gangsters: The Changing Face of Youth Crime (Routledge, 2008) 101. 
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may feel the greatest insecurity or anxiety in times of identity conflict.  That is, those of 
mixed parentage, recent arrival, dynamic class mobility, bilingualism, recent religious 
conversion, those who may appear to have transgressed a boundary, or those with the most 
vulnerable identities within society, perhaps a name that sounds like the language of the 
enemy other or a different skin colour, may be required to perform the most demonstrative 
confirmation of their loyalty or identity.  Anxiety for them comes with the fear that they may 
not adequately reproduce the group self-ideal, also because, as noted above, this ideal is fluid 
and not fixed.  The arbiters of what constitutes an ideal performance may change or the ideal 
my change over time.  Rather than simply assume the ideal is internalizing, it may become 
necessary for those most vulnerable or the most insecure to publicly perform their 
understanding of the social ideal through a public enactment of identity, which may include 
the performance of violence.  By being willing to engage in violence, the vulnerable 
individual demonstrates to the larger collectivity her membership in the group-self.  By 
actively distinguishing herself from the enemy-other the vulnerable seeks the 
acknowledgement of the collective for “defending” the group-self from “incursions” or 
defilement by the other.  Such perpetrators of violence are ‘committing “heroic” acts under 
the economy of identity’ by defending other members of the collective self from the 
“violence” of the isolation and anxiety they themselves have felt.71 Thus, the enactment of 
violent debasement does two things: first it reinforces ones declared collective identity. That 
is, the act of distinction demonstrating that “I am not the other” is accomplished by my 
willingness to commit violence against the enemy-other, which I only see as object and not as 
subject.  This also demonstrates the commitment of the individual self to the larger collective 
self through the exposure both to violence and to the “enemy-other” in himself. A willingness 
to commitment violence against the other, especially to kill the other, is a willingness to kill 
the other within, to eliminate any doubt regarding one’s status, even if only in imagination, 
but especially in actuality. 72   This confirmation of membership comes through the 
performance of exclusion of others.  To be recognized as a member of the collective self it 
may be necessary to violently debase the other.   
 
This performative violence is not instrumental in a material sense, but rather this violence is a 
demonstration of commitment to a collective identity.  In many ways performative violence 
demonstrates a kind of  “creative violence.”  Through this recognition it may be possible to 
replace the violence with another activity that can also perform this creative, bonding task of 
providing a sense of belonging and security. Further an alternative may provide a greater 
sense of ontological security and well being, for requirement to commit repugnant acts of 
violence engenders its own anxiety: to not perform this violence may result in my being 
subjected to it.  This was certainly the case in the unspeakable violence of the Rwandan 
genocide when Hutus were compelled to harm other Hutus who were unwilling to likewise 
commit violence or were other wise deemed to have made “defective” identity performances.  
Pierre Bourdieu pointed out that the Greek word katēgoresthai, from which the verb 
“categorize” and the noun “category” are derived, means to accuse publicly. 73   To determine 
into which category someone belongs can also be seen as a public accusation.  This is power.  
It is the power to name; the power to demand an identity performance; and it suggest the 
power to adjudicate the sufficiency of that performance.  Walter Benjamin wrote that defence 
of a cause, or family life, or civil society ‘becomes violent, in the precise meaning of the 
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University Press, 1998) 156-157.  
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word, when it enters into moral relations.’74  He was interested in examining the meaning and 
importance of violence present in the framework of society (and ultimately in the state), and 
while Benjamin’s project was a very different than what is explored in this chapter, his 
discarding of a monolithic violence, in favour of an analytic frame work that not only 
explores different violences, but suggests that they are used for different ends is useful. In 
order to better understand how to minimise the harmful effects of violence, and to ameliorate 
the conditions that engender such violences, we would likewise do well to follow Benjamin’s 
lead and ask of every particular case, what is being expressed socially through violence?  In 
other words, in order to better understand how people come to join violent groups and engage 
in violent acts, we must ask what is violence doing in this situation? If we move away from 
seeing violence as a singular thing, as an object, and see violence as performances, as social 
acts, we can explore the social work that violence is doing in a given context and a specific 
moment, and perhaps present an alternative set of acts that can replace the violence. Those 
who commit violence may not be making an individual decision to be “bad” or “evil”; they 
may be responding to social expectation and norms in a specific environment.  They may be 
performing their identity. 
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